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THE MISSED OPPORTUNITY OF UNITED STATES V. JONES:   
COMMERCIAL EROSION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION IN A POST-GOOGLE EARTH WORLD 
Mary G. Leary! 
“It is the unwarranted invasion of individual privacy which is reprehended, 
and to be, so far as possible, prevented.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a community in which a police officer with no actual sus-
picion, but perhaps a curiosity, or even a vendetta, wants to spy on an 
individual.  Possibly this curiosity is a concern that the individual is 
laundering money, accepting bribes by way of free home additions, 
using the curtilage of his home as a meeting place for clandestine 
groups, or using that space for some illegal activity such as storing sto-
len vehicles or growing illegal substances.  Imagine further that the 
police officer acts on this curiosity by hiring a high-powered satellite 
with the capability of orbiting over the individual’s home every twen-
ty-four hours and transmitting an image detailed enough to clearly 
see items on the porch or curtilage as small as the size of a baseball 
field’s home plate.  Further, imagine that the people of this commu-
nity are aware of this spying, but have no knowledge of when the po-
lice are doing so, and no mechanism through which they can object.  
They may fence off their property to conceal the activities conducted 
in their private curtilage.  The police, however, have the ability to re-
view images taken over several months and observe items stored, 
changes to this area, evidence of secret outdoor meetings, or evi-
dence of unlicensed home improvements, as well as the movement 
 
 ! Associate Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.  Spe-
cial thanks to Cliff Fishman and Ann McKenna for their insights; Aaron Glaser, Dan 
McGraw, and Rebecca Ryan for their research; the staff of the Journal for their diligence, 
and Julie Kendrick and Stephanie Michael for surviving numerous drafts. 
 1 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 215 
(1890). 
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and identity of objects.  The police can even drive up a public street 
or private road with a high tech 360-degree camera mounted on the 
roof of their vehicle and simultaneously record GPS measurements 
and photograph individuals’ homes, vehicles parked in driveways, 
items such as children’s toys on the porch, or anything visible from as 
close as thirty feet away from the door. 
While this may appear to describe the police surveillance system 
of a military dictatorship or a futuristic Orwellian world, it, in fact, 
describes our world today.  Through satellite imaging technology 
such as Google Earth (and its companion technologies of Google 
Street View and Google Maps), law enforcement—or any person with 
access to a computer—can do just this.  Many individuals know of the 
power of this technology and have lost a sense that they have privacy 
in the curtilage of their home, the area the Supreme Court has de-
scribed as that which “harbors the intimate activity associated with the 
sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”2 
Most individuals would regard such police activity as a govern-
ment “search” requiring a warrant.  However, under current case law, 
this activity does not constitute a search and people have no protec-
tion from it or from its effect of eroding their sense of privacy.  While 
it can be argued this loss of privacy is merely a reflection of our time, 
this privacy loss poses significant challenges for contemporary Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. 
Technologies like the commercially-available satellite imaging 
technology, Internet tracking of personal information, or geospatial 
locating of cell phones, have created a world unforeseen by the Su-
preme Court.  This is a world in which most people have lost a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy and thus any expectation of privacy that 
society is objectively willing to accept has eroded.  Yet, for the past 
forty years, American jurisprudence has primarily defined a search 
under the Fourth Amendment as a government examination of an 
area in which a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”3 
The utility of this definition is seriously in question because of the 
Court’s failure to adequately consider technology’s influence on pri-
vacy expectations.  Although the Court has made some adjustments 
to this search definition over the years, it fails to speak to today’s 
problematic reality.  Even the Court’s most recent opinion in United 
 
 2 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 
U.S. 170, 180 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 3 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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States v. Jones,4 where the Court expanded its definition of a search, 
fails to keep current with technology.  The specific effects of this fail-
ure include diminished Fourth Amendment protections. 
Although the Court has anticipated a future where it will need to 
adjust its search definition, it has not prepared for the present day 
reality.  The Court announced only that when the government condi-
tions people to have no expectation of privacy, will the Court modify 
its search test5 to accommodate that reality.6 
However, today’s privacy threat is not from government condition-
ing.  Commercial activity has created today’s dual reality.  First, private 
commercial entities have introduced technologies into daily life which 
fail to afford individuals the opportunity to demonstrate an expecta-
tion of privacy.  Without the ability to demonstrate a privacy expecta-
tion, the first prong of the Katz test cannot be met.  Second, private 
commercial entities have conditioned individuals to have no expecta-
tion of privacy.  If a “search” requires a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy that society as a whole accepts, and technology has stripped indi-
viduals of any such expectation, then few of the government 
examinations will constitute a search and trigger Fourth Amendment 
protections.  Thus, the public lacks Fourth Amendment protections.  
Such diminishments, mischaracterized as “voluntar[y],”7 are more 
aptly labeled the products of commercial conditioning. 
This Article proposes a legislative solution.  Part I examines the 
Court’s existing approaches to privacy protections as well as its pro-
posed alternatives when a traditional Katz analysis fails.  This review 
includes a thorough analysis of the recently articulated frameworks 
announced in the majority and concurring opinions of Jones.  Part II 
utilizes the example of satellite imaging technology to demonstrate 
the ubiquity of such publicly-available technologies and the constitu-
 
 4 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that the government’s installa-
tion of a global positional system tracking device to a vehicle, and its use of that device to 
monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 5 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the test for governmental viola-
tions of the Fourth Amendment as consisting of “a twofold requirement, first that a per-
son have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, that the ex-
pectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”). 
 6 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (asserting that the Court may engage in 
a normative inquiry to determine whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists in 
certain situations, including those where the government conditions subjective expecta-
tions of privacy). 
 7 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing the disclosure of phone 
numbers an individual dials to his or her cellular provider and of the URLs an individual 
visits to his or her Internet service provider as examples of “information voluntarily dis-
closed to third parties”). 
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tional problem they pose.  Part III identifies that, while the Court’s 
post-Katz opinions have recognized the limits of the Katz test by antic-
ipating governmental “conditioning” that artificially interferes with the 
test, the Court has not anticipated the diminished subjective and ob-
jective expectations of privacy resulting from commercial “condi-
tion[ing] . . . alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment free-
doms.”8  Here, a comprehensive analysis demonstrates the 
inadequacy of the Court’s alternatives, including those suggested in 
Jones.  This Article proposes a new legislative framework for respect-
ing privacy protections in response to these commercial-induced pri-
vacy affronts.  This framework, supported by analogous American law 
and European proposals, calls for an opt-in model:  before an indi-
vidual can be assumed to have voluntarily sacrificed his privacy, he 
must affirmatively opt in to allow the use of his private data.  The opt-
in must, however, be meaningful and not an unfair component of a 
terms of service agreement. 
I.  SEARCH JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  Katz v. United States 
The Fourth Amendment affords people the right “to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”9  Should the government engage in a search 
or seizure, it must do so pursuant to a warrant or an exception to the 
warrant requirement.10  These constraints apply only to government 
searches and seizures.11  Therefore, courts must first determine 
whether the government’s actions in a given investigation constitute a 
“search” at all.  If not, then no Fourth Amendment protections are 
triggered.  Yet the Court has struggled in defining a “search.” 
Perhaps as early as Justice Brandeis’s 1890 article, The Right to Pri-
vacy,12 these questions have been examined through a lens of privacy.  
From 1967 through January 2012, the law has almost exclusively ap-
 
 8 Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 10 Id. (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”); see also Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (illustrating certain rea-
sonable exceptions to the warrant requirement for home searches). 
 11 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects 
only against searches and seizures which are made under governmental authority, real or 
assumed, or under color of such authority.”). 
 12 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1. 
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plied the two-pronged Katz test13 to determine the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment to government searches.14  The test (originally 
from Justice Harlan’s concurrence) demands, absent an exception to 
the warrant requirement, a search warrant if the government exam-
ines an area in which an individual has a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”15  The reasonableness of this expectation is determined by 
establishing that (1) the individual exhibited an actual expectation of 
privacy in the location searched (subjective prong); and (2) that ex-
pectation is one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable (ob-
jective prong).16  Both prongs must be established for the Fourth 
Amendment to apply. 
Many thought, and the Court at the time of Katz articulated, that 
this approach abandoned the previous property-based test for gov-
ernmental searches:  whether there was a physical trespass onto one’s 
property.  Prior to January 2012, the Court explicitly acknowledged 
that Katz discarded a trespass-based analysis, asserting, “[t]he premise 
that property interests control the right of the Government to search 
and seize has been discredited.”17  Indeed, both litigants in Katz had 
framed their arguments around whether the public phone booth at 
issue was a “constitutionally protected area.”18  The Court rejected 
this formulation and reframed the case.19  In so doing the Court ex-
plained that, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.  
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
 
 13 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as imposing “a twofold requirement, first that 
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, that 
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”). 
 14 See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (applying the Katz test to the 
Government’s installation and monitoring of an electronic tracking device called a 
“beeper”); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (applying the Katz test and 
the open fields doctrine to conclude that, although there was a trespass, there was never-
theless no Fourth Amendment violation); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (rejecting trespass analysis 
in favor of privacy analysis, and finding the government had violated the Fourth Amend-
ment, despite the fact that there was no trespass).  As the Court noted in Katz, “[t]he 
premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize 
has been discredited.”  389 U.S. at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 
(1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183 (quoting the 
same language from Katz). 
 15 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 16 Id. at 361. 
 17 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 18 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (No. 35); Brief for the Respondent at 2, Katz, 
389 U.S. 347 (No. 35). 
 19 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (“We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. . . . [T]he cor-
rect formulation of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incanta-
tion of the phrase ‘constitutionally protected area.’”). 
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home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.  
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to 
the public, may be constitutionally protected.”20  In this analysis, the 
Court rejected that property-based trespass framework and reframed 
the legal issue as whether Katz knowingly exposed information to the 
public or attempted to keep said information private.21 
However, nearly half a century later, the Court is again struggling 
with privacy and the Fourth Amendment.  In United States v. Jones,22 
five Justices recharacterized this jurisprudence to assert that both the 
privacy analysis and the physical trespass analysis are part of the cur-
rent framework in determining whether government activity is a 
search.23 
B.  Reservations Concerning Katz 
Almost since Katz was decided, the Court, in various forms, recog-
nized its limitations. 
1.  Justice Harlan 
Just four short years after articulating the two-pronged test in his 
Katz concurrence, its author, Justice Harlan, expressed concern about 
the misuse of the Court’s approach.24  In dissent, Justice Harlan ques-
tioned the White plurality’s analytical framework of searching for 
“subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumption of risk” in 
the situation in White, where the police used electronic means to hear 
what was being said by the defendant.25  The plurality found that the 
defendant’s expectation that his conversation would remain private 
was unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.26  It grounded the opin-
ion in, inter alia, the belief that the Amendment “affords no protec-
 
 20 Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted). 
 21 See id. at 352 (“One who occupies [a booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll 
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into 
the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”). 
 22 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 23 Id. at 951 (noting that neither Katz nor its progeny terminated the previously recognized 
property based protection). 
 24 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the 
shortcomings of the “risk analysis” approach or the “expectations approach of Katz”). 
 25 Id.  In White, the police monitored the defendant’s conversations by having a confidential 
informant wear a radio transmitter during conversations in the informant’s home, a res-
taurant, the informant’s car, and the defendant’s home.  Id. at 746–47.  Police who con-
ducted the surveillance testified at trial when the informant was not able to be located.  
Id. at 747. 
 26 Id. at 749. 
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tion to a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he vol-
untarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”27  Justice Harlan 
asserted that the plurality’s rote application of these concepts “can, 
ultimately, lead to the substitution of words for analysis.”28  He saw the 
limitations of this approach in some situations and insisted that the 
Court do more than merely assess a defendant’s assumption of risk to 
his privacy.29  Rather, the Court must determine whether the law 
should require Fourth Amendment protections.30 
Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of 
laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and pre-
sent.  Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror 
and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and 
risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.31 
Justice Harlan cautioned against rigidly applying a test while los-
ing sight of its purpose.  He then urged the search analysis to focus 
on the fundamental question:  is it right to allow such governmental 
activity without the protections of a warrant?  He also offered an al-
ternative test rooted in the Court engaging in a more fundamental 
analysis.  For him “[t]he critical question, therefore, is whether under 
our system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should 
impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer 
without at least the protection of a warrant requirement.”32  Harlan 
proposed answering this question by a balancing test of:  (1) “as-
sessing the nature of a particular practice" and (2) “the likely extent 
of its impact on the individual’s sense of security balanced against” 
(3) “the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.”33 
2.  Justice Blackmun 
In Smith v. Maryland, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, 
also recognized some limits to Katz’s privacy expectation approach.  
He acknowledged that “[s]ituations can be imagined, of course, in 
which Katz’s two-pronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index 
 
 27 Id. (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 28 White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id.; see also id. at 788 n.24 (“I am now persuaded that such an approach misconceives the 
basic issue, focusing, as it does, on the interests of a particular individual rather than 
evaluating the impact of a practice on the sense of security that is the true concern of the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy.”). 
 31 Id. at 786 (emphasis added). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
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of Fourth Amendment protection.”34  He provided examples of such 
situations, which included “if the Government were suddenly to an-
nounce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be 
subject to warrantless entry,” and “if a refugee from a totalitarian 
country, unaware of this Nation’s traditions, erroneously assumed 
that police were continuously monitoring his telephone conversa-
tions.”35  In each scenario, the individual no longer entertained an ac-
tual expectation of privacy.  To Blackmun those were circumstances  
where an individual’s subjective expectations had been “conditioned” by in-
fluences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective 
expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining 
what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was.  In determining 
whether a “legitimate expectation of privacy” existed in such cases, a 
normative inquiry would be proper.36 
The Court recognized that the government should not be permit-
ted to curtail privacy expectations by conditioning individuals to be-
lieve they are under intrusive or constant surveillance.  Phrased an-
other way, the government cannot destroy an individual’s ability to 
establish a subjective expectation of privacy. 
Of course, this criticism was expounded upon in 1974 by Anthony 
Amsterdam, who challenged the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test, which he labeled “the common formula for Katz.”37  Professor 
Amsterdam argues that this two-prong test actually “destroys the spirit 
of Katz and most of Katz’s substance.”38  Specifically, he argues, “[a]n 
actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a 
statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment protects.”39  Similar to Justice Blackmun’s examples in 
Smith, Amsterdam asserts that if “an actual, subjective expectation of 
privacy” could “add to,  . . . [or in] its absence, detract from, an indi-
vidual’s claim to [F]ourth [A]mendment protection,” then “the gov-
ernment could diminish each person’s subjective expectation of pri-
vacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television . . . that we were 
all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveil-
 
 34 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).  In Smith, the Court held that no search 
occurred when a telephone company, acting at the request of the police, placed a pen 
register on Smith’s phone, thereby confirming that he was the person placing harassing 
phone calls to the victim. 
 35 Id. (emphasis added). 
 36 Id. (emphasis added). 
 37 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 385 
(1974). 
 38 Id. at 383. 
 39 Id. at 384. 
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lance.”40  Amsterdam shares Blackmun’s concern, but even more 
darkly asserts that the action Blackmun warned of had already oc-
curred.  He opines that police surveillance in the 1970s already was 
ubiquitous and resulted in little, if any, basis for a privacy expecta-
tion.41  Neither Blackmun nor Amsterdam, however, envisioned what 
appears to be happening today—individuals are being “conditioned” 
by commercial influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amend-
ment freedoms.  Individuals are losing their right to privacy due to 
commercial forces removing that expectation without affording indi-
viduals the opportunity to demonstrate a privacy expectation. 
3.  Justice Scalia and Kyllo 
Justice Scalia has been a longstanding critic of the Katz test, noting 
at one point that “the only thing . . . established about the Katz 
test . . . is that, unsurprisingly, those actual (subjective) expectations 
of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, bear an 
uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court 
considers reasonable.”42  In 2001 Justice Scalia continued his criticism 
of the Katz approach in Kyllo v. United States.43  Writing for the majori-
ty, Justice Scalia concluded that police use of a thermal imaging de-
vice aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative 
amounts of heat within a home constituted a search within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment.44  In so doing, Justice Scalia neither 
relied upon nor embraced Katz, but echoed his previous criticism.45  
Asserting that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of 
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been en-
tirely unaffected by the advance of technology,” Justice Scalia instead 
focused his analysis on the fact that officers had surveilled Kyllo’s 
home.46  The Court held that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technol-
ogy any information regarding the interior of the home that could 
not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search—at least where 
 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. (“I have had no actual, subjective expectation of privacy in my telephone, my office or 
my home since I began handling civil rights cases in the early 1960’s [sic].”). 
 42 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration omitted) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 43 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (citing sources that are critical of Katz). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. (noting criticisms that describe the Katz test as “circular, and hence subjective and un-
predictable”). 
 46 Id. at 33–34. 
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(as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.”47  
When technology facilitated a search, which previously would have 
required physical trespass, his analysis considers two important fac-
tors:  (1) whether the target of the search is a home, and (2) whether 
the technology was in general public use.48 
Justice Scalia’s return to a common law trespass-based analysis is 
not without its critics.  As will be discussed infra, many of these argu-
ments are summarized by Justice Alito in Jones.  Justice Alito laid out 
five objections to Justice Scalia’s approach in Jones, including that it 
had “little if any support in current Fourth Amendment case law.”49  
He also referenced misplaced significance, incongruent results, and a 
lack of uniformity among states.50  Justice Alito argued that twenty-
first century technology issues should not be settled utilizing eight-
eenth century tort law.51  Justice Alito’s major critique, that such an 
approach has been rejected by the Court, is not without merit.52 
C.  United States v. Jones 
In Jones, the Court had the opportunity to address the govern-
ment’s use of technology to conduct surveillance.  In Jones, the police 
suspected the defendant of involvement in the narcotics trade.53  In 
an effort to gather information, they subjected him to twenty-four 
hour surveillance by placing a GPS device on his automobile.54  This 
surveillance lasted twenty-eight days and required the police to physi-
cally trespass the vehicle a second time to replace the battery.55  The 
GPS ultimately produced approximately 2000 pages of information.56  
 
 47 Id. at 34 (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 
(1961)). 
 48 Id. at 34, 40. 
 49 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 50 Id. at 961. 
 51 Id. at 962. 
 52 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (concluding that “the reach of 
[the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intru-
sion,” and that “‘trespass’ doctrine . . . can no longer be regarded as controlling”); War-
den v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (“The premise that property interests control 
the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.”); Amsterdam, su-
pra note 37, at 357 (describing the Supreme Court’s rejection in Katz of the “concept of 
‘constitutionally protected areas’”). 
 53 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
 54 Id.  Although the vehicle was registered to Jones’s wife, it was primarily operated by Jones.  
Id. at 949 n.2.  In actuality, the government had obtained a search warrant, but failed to 
adhere to its terms.  Id. at 948.  Thus, it had to defend its actions as if no warrant had 
been obtained.  Id. at 948 n.1. 
 55 Id. at 948. 
 56 Id. 
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The government used some of this information to link the defendant 
to the location where narcotics were situated.57 
The Court granted certiorari to determine, among other ques-
tions, whether the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle 
for approximately four weeks constituted a search within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment.58  All nine Justices concluded that 
such activity constituted a search.59  Unfortunately, the case produced 
three separate opinions, which arrived at this result in three very dif-
ferent ways.  The Court missed an opportunity to reframe the ques-
tion of privacy so as to reflect twenty-first century realities. 
Justice Scalia, writing for the five-Justice majority, held that “the 
Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and 
its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes 
a ‘search.’”60  In so doing, Justice Scalia minimized the importance of 
the Katz test, stating that “Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not 
rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”61  Rather, the majority asserted 
that the fundamental mission of the Court was not to reflect current 
privacy expectations, but to “‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of 
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amend-
ment was adopted.’”62  To reflect this eighteenth century standard, 
the Court returned to a trespass analysis: 
[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to em-
body a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (“per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects”) it enumerates.  Katz did not repudiate 
that understanding. . . . “We do not believe that Katz, by holding that the 
Fourth Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was 
intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment ex-
tends to the home. . . .”63 
 
 57 Id. at 948–49. 
 58 Id. at 948.  Originally the Court was poised to answer two questions.  The question pre-
sented by the parties was “[w]hether the warrantless use of a tracking device on respond-
ent’s vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.”  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2011) (No. 10-1259).  
However, the Court added the second question—whether attaching a GPS tracking de-
vice to a vehicle for approximately four weeks constituted a Fourth Amendment search—
and ultimately only resolved that question, leaving the propriety of the monitoring with-
out physical trespass and a warrant unresolved.  Jones, 131 S. Ct. at 948. 
 59 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949; id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concur-
ring). 
 60 Id. at 949 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted). 
 61 Id. at 950. 
 62 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). 
 63 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51 (alterations omitted) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180 (1969)). 
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The Jones majority explicitly states that trespass is not the exclusive 
test, or alone sufficient to evaluate Fourth Amendment liability.64  
However, the Jones Court also concludes that Katz did not erode the 
physical trespass analysis or the principle that “when the government 
does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area 
in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.”65  Thus, although the Court in Jones 
did not overturn Katz, Justice Scalia in essence reduced it to a sup-
plement to the primary concern of physical trespass. 
Justice Alito, with whom Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan 
joined, concurred in judgment but rejected the reversion to a tres-
pass analysis.  Justice Alito concurred that the GPS surveillance in this 
case was a search by applying the traditional Katz test.66  That is to say 
he “would analyze . . . this case by asking whether respondent’s rea-
sonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term moni-
 
 64 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51, 951 n.5 (“Trespass alone does not qualify, but there must be 
conjoined with that what was present here:  an attempt to find something or to obtain in-
formation.”). 
 65 Id. at 951 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., con-
curring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The majority’s support for this claim that 
Katz did not replace the trespass analysis but supplemented it is somewhat dubious.  The 
main support for this proposition is the concurring opinions and the responses therein to 
the cases Justice Alito cites in his concurrence as evidence that the trespass doctrine has 
been overturned.  Compare Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 947, 951 (citing Soldal v. Cook County, 506 
U.S. 56, 60, 62, 64 (1992); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180 (1969)) (listing 
precedential Supreme Court cases as support for the proposition that the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test supplemented the common law trespass test, instead of replac-
ing it); with Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 960 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The majority suggests that two 
post-Katz decisions show that a technical trespass is sufficient to establish the existence of 
a search, but they provide little support.” (citations omitted) (citing Soldal, 506 U.S. at 56; 
Alderman, 394 U.S. at 165)).  For examples of cases cited by Justice Alito in his dissent in 
support of his claim that Katz eliminated the trespass doctrine, see Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 959 
(Alito, J., concurring) (“This trespass based rule was repeatedly criticized. . . [Katz] finally 
did away with the old approach, holding that a trespass was not required for a Fourth Amend-
ment violation.” (emphasis added) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967))); id. 
at 960 (“The existence of a property right is but one element in determining whether ex-
pectations of privacy are legitimate.  The premise that property interests control the right 
of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.” (quoting Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. (quoting Rakas 
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (citing a description that characterized Katz as hold-
ing that the “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not up-
on a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the 
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded 
place”)); id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (“We have since de-
coupled violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory violation of 
his property . . . .”)); id. (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984) (“[A]n 
actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”)). 
 66 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that the GPS surveillance was a 
search under a test that “appl[ies] existing Fourth Amendment doctrine”). 
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toring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”67  He concluded 
under a pure Katz analysis “that the lengthy monitoring that occurred 
in this case constituted a search under Fourth Amendment.”68  Not-
withstanding that conclusion, Justice Alito left open the possibility 
that shorter term monitoring might “accord[] with expectations of 
privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.”69  In so doing, 
Justice Alito vigorously protested the majority’s resurrection of the 
trespass approach, which he regarded as discredited.70  “In sum, the 
majority is hard pressed to find support in post-Katz cases for its tres-
pass-based theory.”71  Nevertheless, Justice Alito acknowledged that a 
Katz analysis is at times inadequate in an era of increasing technolog-
ical surveillance, and appealed for a legislative response.72 
Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Scalia’s opinion that “the Katz 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substi-
tuted for, the common law trespassory test,”73 but she also wrote sepa-
rately, agreeing in substance with much of Justice Alito’s opinion.74  
 
 67 Id. at 958. 
 68 Id. at 964. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See id. at 959–61 (describing the historical discrediting of the trespass approach); see also 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (discrediting trespass analysis). 
 71 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice Alito also cited four additional flaws 
with the majority opinion; he pointed out that the majority’s approach:  (1) disregards 
the significance of long-term GPS tracking but misplaces significance by emphasizing in-
stead the trivial act of placing the device on a car; (2) produces incongruous results in 
which a GPS attachment, no matter how brief, automatically triggers a search, but com-
prehensive twenty-four-hour monitoring through aerial and visual surveillance does not; 
(3) produces different results from state to state based on the property laws of the states; 
and (4) presents “particularly vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is car-
ried out by making electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be 
tracked.”  Id. at 961–62. 
 72 Id. at 964 (citation omitted) (“In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, 
the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.  A legislative body is well situated 
to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and 
public safety in a comprehensive way.” (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New 
Technologies:  Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805–06 
(2004) (advocating for legislatures, rather than the judiciary, to be the mechanism for 
creating “the primary investigative rules when technology is changing”))); see also Eric 
Lichtblau, Police are Using Phone Tracking as Routine Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, at 1, 20 
(discussing law enforcement’s use of cell phone technology in surveillance and tracing 
for both emergencies and routine investigations). 
 73 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“As 
the majority’s opinion makes clear, however, Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test 
augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law trespassory test that pre-
ceded it.”). 
 74 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Under that rubric [wherein technological advances 
make nontrespassory surveillance possible and shape societal privacy expectations], I 
agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investiga-
 
344 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
Like Justice Scalia, she asserted that Fourth Amendment protections 
include, at a minimum, protection from physical trespass, as well as 
the Katz protection of privacy when the trespass analysis is not appli-
cable.75  However, she did not seem assured that the sole answer to 
these contemporary challenges lay in eighteenth century truisms.  
Justice Sotomayor, more so than either Justice Scalia or Justice Alito, 
was particularly concerned about the increased ability of law en-
forcement to use modern techniques to search without physical in-
trusion through technological advancement.76  She went further than 
Justice Alito, stating that “cases involving even short-term monitor-
ing . . . require particular attention.”77  She explicitly expressed a de-
sire that the jurisprudence reflect an understanding of the technolog-
ical realities of contemporary surveillance.  She noted concern about 
the high volume of information which could be obtained from twen-
ty-four hour monitoring of one’s vehicle through a GPS device,78 the 
danger of entrusting the government to use a tool “so amenable to 
misuse,”79 and the questionable validity of the Third Party Doctrine80 
in an age when technology requires people to “reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carry-
ing out mundane tasks.”81 
II.  SURVEILLANCE, OBTAINING INFORMATION, AND SATELLITE IMAGING 
TECHNOLOGY 
The Supreme Court majority’s recent articulation in Jones that the 
Fourth Amendment can be implicated when the government tres-
passes and engages in an “attempt to find something or to obtain in-
 
tions of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’” (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 
964 (Alito, J., concurring))). 
 75 Id. at 954–55. 
 76 Id. at 955. (“[P]hysical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveil-
lance. . . . GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s pub-
lic movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, re-
ligious, and sexual associations.”). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 956. 
 80 The Third Party Doctrine asserts that the Fourth Amendment allows “the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by [the third party] to Government 
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only 
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”  
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 81 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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formation”82 possibly has significant implications.  This description of 
the Fourth Amendment may implicate technologies that allow the 
same access to information that a physical trespass would permit.  By 
way of example, police use of satellite imaging technology to examine 
an individual’s private property is “an attempt to obtain information” 
without a physical trespass. 
Today, law enforcement, and any individual with Internet access 
for that matter, has the ability to use a high-powered satellite to ex-
amine the property of another in some detail, no matter where in the 
world the property is located.  No warrant is required because this 
likely will not constitute a search under the Court’s current defini-
tion.  The individual subject of such surveillance has no choice in 
this, regardless of what he does to deny public access to his property.  
While such examinations are not real time video footage of property, 
they do allow observation of relatively recent images of one’s property 
and comparison of these images over time.  Thus, the viewer could 
observe the presence or absence of structures, machinery, crops, 
meeting places, vehicles, activities, etc.  Furthermore, examination of 
real time imaging is certainly technologically possible and may soon 
also reach commercial viability.83  While a detailed analysis of how this 
technology works is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief under-
standing of the technology is helpful in analyzing its impact on priva-
cy. 
The ability to engage in this surveillance is possible through a 
combination of satellite imaging technology and software processing.  
Satellite imaging technology is a component of currently-existing 
technology that allows one to access images of a specific location in 
the world and zoom in to obtain a view from the equivalent of ap-
proximately five meters away.  A common example of this is Google 
Earth, one of the many commercially-available services that provides 
 
 82 Id. at 951 n.5 (majority opinion) (“Likewise with a search.  Trespass alone does not quali-
fy, but there must be conjoined with that what was present here:  an attempt to find 
something or to obtain information.”). 
 83 This could occur through satellite images or, more likely, drones.  See JAY STANLEY & 
CATHERINE CRUMP, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL 
SURVEILLANCE:  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE AIRCRAFT 2–10 
(2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/report-protecting-
privacy-aerial-surveillance-recommendations-government-use (examining the use of 
drones at all levels of law enforcement and FAA efforts to develop policy to facilitate such 
use); Brian Bennett, Police employ Predator drone spy planes on home front, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
10, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/dec/10/nation/la-na-drone-arrest-
20111211 (discussing the use of U.S. Customs and Border Protection drones by local po-
lice). 
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access to satellite images and enhances them for more detail.84  Com-
bined with Google Street View,85 this technology allows law enforce-
ment—or anyone else—to access pictures of one’s property through 
a powerful satellite and observe how said area changes over time.  
Google Earth images are sourced from not only satellite imagery, but 
also from aerial photography and data from many imagery provid-
ers.86  Google describes its service as allowing one to “[v]iew satellite 
imagery, maps, terrain, 3D buildings, galaxies far in space, and the 
deepest depths of the ocean.”87  While other companies provide this 
service, Google Earth is paramount among them due to the large 
amount of media coverage it receives.88 
The road to this technology becoming commonly available at no 
cost to the customer began in 2004, when Google acquired the soft-
ware company Keyhole Corporation.89  At the time of this acquisition, 
the parties described Keyhole as allowing one to “fly like a superhero 
from your computer at home to a street corner somewhere else in the 
world.”90  At that time, Google described the acquisition as giving 
Google users 
a powerful new search tool, enabling users to view 3D images of any place 
on earth as well as tap a rich database of roads, businesses and many oth-
er points of interest. . . . With an Internet connection, users enter an ad-
dress or other location information and Keyhole’s software accesses the 
database and takes them to a digital image of that location on their com-
 
 84 GOOGLE EARTH, http://www.google.com/earth/index.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2012); see 
also BING MAPS, http://www.bing.com/maps/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2012); YAHOO! MAPS, 
http://maps.yahoo.com (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
 85 Street View, GOOGLE MAPS, http://www.google.com/streetview (last visited Oct. 21, 2012) 
(“Google Maps with Street View lets you explore places around the world through 360-
degree street-level imagery.”). 
 86 See Support FAQs:  “What data does TerraMetrics provide to Google Earth and Google Maps?”, 
TERRAMETRICS, http://truearth.com/support/faqs_content_google.htm (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2012) (detailing the composited data of which Google Earth and Google Maps 
are comprised, and attributing the satellite imagery provided to by TerraMetrics). 
 87 Google Earth for Desktop, GOOGLE EARTH, http://www.google.com/earth/explore/
products/desktop.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
 88 See, e.g., Dan Fletcher, Top 10 Google Earth Finds, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/
specials/packages/article/0,28804,1881770_1881787_1881774,00.html (last visited Sept. 
9, 2012) (devoting an online slideshow to ten “of the most unusual discoveries” found by 
Google Earth users); Andrew C. Revkin, Google Earth Dives Deep, Filling In Its Maps’ Watery 
Gaps, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at D3 (detailing the functionality and newly developed fea-
tures of Google Earth); Iain Thomson, Upgrade eliminates Atlantis from Google 
Earth, REGISTER (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/02/06/google_
earth_atlantis/ (reporting an update to the Google Earth software that eliminated an im-
age which some had believed to be evidence of the lost city of Atlantis). 
 89 Google Acquires Keyhole Corp, NEWS FROM GOOGLE (Oct. 27, 2004), http://googlepress.
blogspot.com/2004/10/google-acquires-keyhole-corp.html. 
 90 Id. 
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puter screen.  The interactive software then gives users many options, in-
cluding the ability to zoom in from space-level to street-level, tilt and ro-
tate the view or search for other information . . . .91 
Google later contracted with high resolution satellite companies, 
such as DigitalGlobe and GeoEye, which launch satellites and provide 
the imagery to Google.92  These companies describe these images as 
“high-quality images.”93  Some of the satellites owned by such compa-
nies have the capacity to record images at fifty centimeter resolu-
tion.94  One such company explains that this level of detail allows cus-
tomers to “map natural and man-made features to within five meters 
(about sixteen feet) of their actual location on the surface of the 
Earth.”95  Another describes this level of detail as allowing a viewer to 
discriminate between grass and trees, and to examine a road and de-
termine whether it is in need of resurfacing.96  However, Google also 
supplements these images with other images obtained by aircraft, 
some of whose resolutions are as high as thirty to sixty centimeters.97 
Today, Google Earth has continued to grow in its abilities to de-
velop images from anywhere in the world.  Google uses satellites 
owned by third-party operators, most of which are private, but at least 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 See GeoEye & Google, GEOEYE, http://www.geoeye.com/GeoEye101/GeoEye-
Google/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (promoting Google’s use of GeoEye-1 
satellite imagery on its Google Earth and Google Maps platforms); see also History:  The 
Growth of the Business, DIGITALGLOBE, http://www.digitalglobe.com/about-
us/history#/the-growth-of-the-business (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (noting the digital satel-
lite imagery agreement between DigitalGlobe and Google, which dates back to 2002); 
Support FAQs:  “What data does TerraMetrics provide to Google Earth and Google Maps?”, 
http://truearth.com/support/faqs_content_google.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (at-
tributing the “baselayer imagery” provided to Google Earth and Google Maps to Terra-
Metrics TruEarth technology). 
 93 SPOT:  Looking Down On Earth, CNES, http://www.cnes.fr/web/CNES-en/1415-spot.php 
(last updated Aug. 2009) (chronicling the history of the “Satellite Pour l’Observation de 
la Terre” (SPOT satellites)). 
 94 See High-Resolution Imagery, Resolution Modes, GEOEYE, http://www.geoeye.com/
GeoEye101/satellite-imagery/high-resolution-imagery.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) 
(observing that though the GeoEye-1 satellite can record images at forty-one centimeter 
resolution, which allows one to view “home plate on a baseball field,” the National Ocean-
ic and Atmosphere Administration requires satellite imaging companies to convert these 
images to fifty centimeter resolution for commercial use). 
 95 Collecting Images with GeoEye-1, GEOEYE, http://www.geoeye.com/GeoEye101/satellite-
imagery/collection-method.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
 96 DIGITALGLOBE, THE BENEFITS OF THE EIGHT SPECTRAL BANDS OF WORLDVIEW-2, at 3–7 
(Mar. 2010), available at http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/white-papers/DG-
8SPECTRAL-WP.pdf (“The high spatial resolution enables the discrimination of fine de-
tails, like vehicles, shallow reefs and even individual trees in an orchard . . . .”). 
 97 Precision Aerial, DIGITALGLOBE, http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/AerialProgram-
DS-AP-Web.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
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some of which are related to some government agencies.98  Each of 
these third parties has numerous satellites, which vary in ability to 
record data.  Generally, these satellites travel a certain orbit that al-
lows them to orbit the Earth as many as fifteen times a day, with a 
more typical frequency of from once every 1.1 days to once every 5.9 
days.99  While in orbit, they can observe land for a lengthy period of 
time.  They do not provide live pictures with a live feed to the Inter-
net.  Rather, the images are collected, uploaded, stored, transmitted, 
and processed before being placed on the Internet.100  Although not 
live, the ability to quickly produce photographs has been demon-
strated by recent satellite images from the capsizing of the Costa 
Concordia, as well as satellite images relating to national security 
concerns, such as images of the Chinese aircraft carrier Varyag.101  
 
 98 See History:  The Early Years, DIGITALGLOBE, http://www.digitalglobe.com/about-
us/history (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (“In 1993, the United States Department of Com-
merce granted DigitalGlobe . . . the first license allowing a private enterprise to build and 
operate a satellite system to gather high-resolution digital imagery of the Earth for com-
mercial sale.”); About CNES, CNES, http://www.cnes.fr/web/CNES-en/3773-about-
cnes.php, (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (“[T]he Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) 
is the government agency responsible for shaping and implementing France’s space poli-
cy in Europe.”); About Us, GEOEYE, http://www.geoeye.com/CorpSite/about-
us/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (“The Company’s growing global sales network 
currently comprises 12 strategic business partners (government and commercial) . . . .”); 
About Us:  Company Info, TERRAMETRICS, http://www.truearth.com/about_info/company_
content.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (“TerraMetrics provides . . . technologies to a 
broad customer base including U.S. Department of Defense agencies, the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA), . . . [and] international governments . . . .”). 
 99 See Collecting Images with GeoEye-1, GEOEYE, http://www.geoeye.com/GeoEye101/satellite-
imagery/collection-method.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (listing the features and speci-
fications of the GeoEye-1 satellite); Design and Specifications:  Quickbird, DIGITALGLOBE, 
http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/QuickBird-DS-QB-Web.pdf (last visited Sept. 
21, 2012) (listing the features and specifications of the Quickbird satellite); Design and 
Specifications:  WorldView-1, DIGITALGLOBE, http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/
WorldView1-DS-WV1-Web.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (listing the features and speci-
fications of the WorldView-1 satellite); Design and Specifications:  WorldView-2, 
DIGITALGLOBE, http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/WorldView2-DS-WV2-Web.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (listing the features and specifications of the WorldView-2 sat-
ellite); SPOT satellite technical data, CNES, http://spot5.cnes.fr/gb/programme/111.htm 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (listing the features and specifications of the SPOT-5 satellite). 
100 See A highly effective operational system, CNES, http://spot5.cnes.fr/gb/systeme/
systeme.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (specifying that two operators that conduct a se-
ries of separate processes are required to produce final images from the SPOT satellites, 
including a satellite operator that manages the performance of the satellite and a com-
mercial operator that processes, generates, and distributes the resulting images); Tech-
nical features and operation, CNES, http://www.cnes.fr/web/CNES-en/1420-technical-
features-and-operation.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (explicating the technical pro-
cesses by which SPOT satellites record and transmit images to stations on the ground). 
101 Satellite Spots Costa Concordia Shipwreck from Space, SPACE.COM (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://www.space.com/14273-satellite-photo-costa-concordia-cruise-shipwreck.html (re-
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DigitalGlobe, one of the third-party satellite operators, has promised 
that its next generation of satellites will possess enough speed to re-
examine the same geographical location within twenty-four hours.102  
Another company, Centre National d’Etudes Spaciales (“CNES”), as-
serts that its satellites can work in tandem to cover a 120 kilometer 
swath of land in a single pass, and in some cases can acquire imagery 
of any point in the globe in less than three days.103  Another asserts 
that its satellites have average revisit times of 1.1 day for the entire 
globe.104 
While these satellites are owned primarily by third parties, some 
possess a nexus with government activity.  For example, the Spot 5 
Program is run by CNES, the French government agency responsible 
for shaping France’s space policy.105  Indeed, CNES argues that its 
“Earth observation satellites are vital asset [sic] for science, industry 
and the military alike.  Carrying ever-enhanced viewing instruments, 
they can acquire repeat coverage of vast areas systematically and yield 
very detailed images.”106  Similarly, Google has an exclusive contract 
for online use of imagery supplied by GeoEye,107 a company that was 
also awarded a 3.8 billion dollar contract with the National Geospa-
 
porting on a photograph taken on January 17, 2012 by DigitalGlobe satellites of the cap-
sized Costa Concordia, a cruise ship that wrecked off the coast of Italy on January 13, 
2012); Stephen Wood, Capturing the Varyag, DIGITALGLOBE BLOG (Dec. 19, 2011), 
http://www.digitalglobeblog.com/2011/12/19/capturing-the-varyag-stephen-wood-vp-
analysis-center/ (discussing the documentation in DigitalGlobe satellite images of the se-
cond sea trial of the Chinese aircraft carrier known as the Varyag). 
102 See WorldView-3, DIGITALGLOBE, http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/WorldView3-
DS-WV3-Web.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (attesting that “WorldView-3 has an average 
revisit time of [less than one] day”). 
103 Instrument Features, CNES, http://spot5.cnes.fr/gb/satellite/42.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012) (explaining that, although HRG “instruments generally operate independently to 
observe separate targets,” they can  “view in tandem to cover a 120-kilometre swath in a 
single pass” and “can acquire imagery of any point on the globe within less than five days, 
or even in less than three days at temperate latitudes”). 
104 See DIGITALGLOBE, THE BENEFITS OF THE EIGHT SPECTRAL BANDS OF WORLDVIEW-2, at 3 
(Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/white-papers/DG-
8SPECTRAL-WP.pdf (advertising that, among other features, DigitalGlobe’s “second next 
generation” satellite, WorldView-2, will “offer average revisit times of 1.1 days around the 
globe”). 
105 See About CNES, CNES, http://www.cnes.fr/web/CNES-en/3773-about-cnes.php (last vis-
ited Sept. 9, 2012) (“Founded in 1961, the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) is 
the government agency responsible for shaping and implementing France’s space policy 
in Europe.  Its task is to invent the space systems of the future, bring space technologies 
to maturity and guarantee France’s independent access to space.”). 
106 Observing Earth, CNES, http://spot5.cnes.fr/gb/applications/21.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012). 
107 Stephen Shankland, Google to buy GeoEye Satellite Imagery, CNET NEWS (Aug. 29, 2008, 7:27 
AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10028842-93.html. 
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tial-Intelligence Agency,108 which is GeoEye’s largest customer, ac-
counting for 65% percent of its revenue in 2009.109 
Google has expanded this effort through Google Street View, 
which was launched in the United States in 2007 and is now available 
throughout the world.110  This service provides “360-degree panoram-
ic views” of streets on all seven continents.111  Google obtains these 
images through a fleet of vehicles with nine cameras and Wi-Fi an-
tennas mounted upon them that capture and store wireless data.112  
For locations inaccessible to vehicles, Google creates smaller vehicles 
described as “Google Trikes.”113  According to Google, “the latest car 
has [fifteen] lenses taking 360 degrees of photos.  It also has motion 
sensors to track its position, a hard drive to store data, a small com-
puter running the system, and lasers to capture 3D data to determine 
distances . . . .”114  The cameras are stationed nearly nine feet high 
and “allow[] Google to peer over fences to photograph [images not 
visible] to an ordinary person walking down the street.”115  Additional-
ly, the Street View user can zoom in on images well beyond what the 
ordinary observer can see.116 
With this technology in the hands of government officials, the im-
plications for police surveillance are significant.  A common sense 
approach would suggest that police use of these satellites to examine  
an individual’s property from five meters above the ground is a 
search.  However, under a traditional analysis, it may not be a search.  
First, people cannot demonstrate subjective expectations of privacy 
because companies like Google never afford them the opportunity to 
demonstrate such expectations by opting out of the imaging.  Se-
cond, many individuals are aware of the technology’s use, and society, 
 
108 GeoEye Wins National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Enhanced View Award, SPACE DAILY (Aug. 
10 2010) http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/GeoEye_Wins_National_Geospatial_Intelli
gence_Agency_Enhanced_View_Award_999.html. 
109 A. Ananthalakshmi, UPDATE 1–GeoEye Q2 profit beats Street view, REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2009), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/10/geoeye-idUSBNG50871620090810. 
110 See In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1070 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011) (noting that Google Street View has expanded to more than thirty countries 
worldwide). 
111 Id. at 1070–71; Street View:  Cars, Trikes, and More, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com
/help/maps/streetview/learn/cars-trikes-and-more.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). 
112 Google, 794 F. Supp. at 1071. 
113 Id. 
114 Street View:  Cars, Trikes, and More, supra note 111. 
115 Roger C. Geissler, Note, Private Eyes Watching You:  Google Street View and the Right to an In-
violate Personality, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 897, 902 (2012). 
116 Id. at 902–03. 
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therefore, lacks an objective acceptance of any expectation of privacy.  
Thus, individuals are powerless to stop this privacy encroachment. 
III.  THE PROBLEM IS NOT TRESPASS OR GOVERNMENT USE OF 
TECHNOLOGY:  THE PROBLEM IS UBIQUITOUS ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE BY COMMERCIAL ENTITIES AND ITS EFFECT ON 
INDIVIDUALS 
As recognized to some degree by Justices Alito and Sotomayor in 
their Jones concurring opinions, technological advances have altered 
the landscape significantly since 1967.  This role of technology is not 
a new revelation.  As early as 1890, Warren and Brandeis recognized 
that technological advances demand the law move toward privacy 
protection.117  In 2010 the Court acknowledged the role of technology 
in determining conceptions of privacy, stating that “[r]apid changes 
in the dynamics of communication and information transmission are 
evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as 
proper behavior.”118  The Court further cautioned against ruling on 
such questions until a new technology’s role in society becomes 
clear.119  Technological development of the telephone pushed Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence forward in Katz to recognize that the old 
way of measuring a search, the physical trespass, was no longer solely 
sufficient to protect what was deemed as private under the Fourth 
Amendment.120  So too we now find ourselves in need of a twenty-first 
century solution. 
Although there is significant disagreement between Justices Scalia 
and Alito as to whether Katz discarded the trespass approach to 
searches, it appears that post-Jones, courts must first engage in a tres-
pass analysis, and if that fails, they can then apply a Katz analysis.  Jus-
tice Scalia explicitly asserts that “we do not make trespass the exclu-
sive test.  Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic 
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”121  
 
117 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195. (“Recent inventions and business methods call 
attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for 
securing . . . the right ‘to be let alone.’”). 
118 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (declining to rule on whether one 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages). 
119 Id. (“The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implica-
tions of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.”). 
120 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967) (suggesting that a refusal to protect 
telephone communications would “ignore the vital role that the public telephone has 
come to play in private communication,” and going on to reject strict trespass analysis as 
the sole measure for whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated). 
121 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (emphasis omitted). 
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However, his lack of further discussion of this category suggests that 
he views such situations as uncommon.  As the two concurring opin-
ions underscore, however, transmission of electronic signals without 
trespass comprises the vast majority of surveillance methods today.  
Therefore, whichever test is applied is flawed.  If no physical trespass 
occurs, then the trespass approach provides no protection.  If no op-
portunity to demonstrate a privacy expectation exists, then Katz also 
fails to protect. 
A.  Neither the Jones nor Katz Approaches Respond Adequately to This 
Reality 
The satellite imaging technology exemplifies the shortfall of the 
Court’s current approach in defining a search.  Without physical 
trespass, law enforcement—or anyone else—can attempt to gain in-
formation regarding an individual and his personal activities that oc-
cur out of public view.  It is the fact that anyone can do so that pro-
vides the largest challenge to current Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections.  Because individuals are aware of the power of this tech-
nology and its widespread use, many believe they actually have no 
privacy.  This perception can exist both because of the existence of 
such technology, as well as because of its misuse.  For example, 
Google has apologized for, and admitted to, utilizing a wireless sniffer 
on its Google Street View vehicles,122 obtaining data packets of infor-
mation including user name and passwords, and storing said infor-
mation.123  The FCC fined Google for obstructing its investigation of 
Street View124 and German officials characterized the data collection 
 
122 A wireless sniffer is a data collection system that samples, collects, decodes, and analyzes 
types of data broadcast through Wi-Fi connections.  In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. 
Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (defining a data sniffer 
and noting that Google “issued an apology” and “admitted to intercepting” data through 
Street View vehicles); Kevin J. O’Brien & David Streitfeld, Swiss Court Orders Modifications 
to Google Street View, N.Y TIMES (June 8, 2012) www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/
technology/09iht-google09.html (“Google has maintained that the collection of private 
information was accidental . . . . [and] was not intended for or used in any Google prod-
uct.”). 
123 Google, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (“The wireless sniffer secretly captures data pack-
ets . . . [which] must be stored on digital media and then decoded using . . . complicated 
technology.”); see also Geissler, supra note 115, at 906 (noting that, in May and October of 
2010, Google admitted that its camera-fitted cars had collected data from private, non-
password protected WiFi networks, and that “entire emails and URLS were captured, as 
well as passwords”) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Creating stronger privacy controls in-
side Google, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Oct. 22, 2010), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/
2010/10/creating-stronger-privacy-controls.html). 
124 O’Brien & Streitfeld, supra note 122 (“[T]he F.C.C. fined Google $25,000, saying it had 
obstructed an investigation into Street View.”); David Streitfeld & Kevin J. O’Brien, Google 
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as “one of the biggest violations of data protection laws that [they] 
had ever seen.”125  While regulators have sought the data collected, no 
U.S. regulator has seen it despite efforts by over thirty states’ Attor-
neys General.126  In this kind of reality, individuals lose the expecta-
tion of privacy under our current jurisprudence. 
At first glance, it may appear that these technologies cause no new 
Fourth Amendment ramifications because of precedent allowing sub-
stantial law enforcement surveillance.  The combined caselaw that 
permits law enforcement to examine curtilage from navigable air-
space;127 to monitor one’s movements on public thoroughfares;128 and 
to accept information disclosed to third parties (Third Party Doc-
trine)129 initially suggests that government use of satellite imaging 
technology may be without constitutional significance.  However, this 
argument misses the issue.  The issue is not the propriety of law en-
forcement’s use of satellite imaging technologies (which itself does 
raise questions).  Rather, the issue is a more fundamental question 
regarding the effect of these technologies on the subjective expectation of 
privacy.  Namely, what happens when the reasonable expectation of 
privacy is compromised or diminished not by government “condition-
ing,” but rather by the inescapable reality of the commercial use of 
 
Privacy Inquiries Get Little Cooperation, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2012), www.nytimes.com/2012
/05/23/technology/google-privacy-inquiries-get-little-cooperation.html (“[The F.C.C.] 
tagged Google with a $25,000 fine for obstructing the [Street View data collection] inves-
tigation.”). 
125 O’Brien & Streitfeld, supra note 122 (quoting Johannes Caspar, a German data protec-
tion official). 
126 Id. 
127 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (suggesting that law enforcement is “free to in-
spect the yard from the vantage point of an aircraft flying in the navigable airspace”); see 
also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (“In an age where private and com-
mercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect 
that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the 
naked eye . . . .”). 
128 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984) (explaining that, although monitoring 
of a beeper—a type of electronic surveillance device—is impermissible while the beeper 
is within the confines of a private residence, gathering information from beeper surveil-
lance while the beeper is on public streets is constitutionally permissible under the 
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person travel-
ing in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his movements from one place to another.”). 
129 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (finding that “a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties”); United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (acknowledging that “the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by 
him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption 
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third par-
ty will not be betrayed”). 
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surveillance technology and the commercial or social conditioning 
that accompanies it? 
One ramification of this conditioning is the evisceration of priva-
cy.  It could mean that no individual possesses a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in the curtilage of his or her home.  In effect, all yards, 
patios, porches, decks, rear driveways, fenced in structures, or plant-
ings—i.e., anything not covered by a roof or thick canopy of trees, 
even if completely removed from public view—have become “open 
fields,” and therefore searchable.  Similarly, the data collected from 
individuals online, at times unbeknownst to them, is available for cap-
ture and review.130  Indeed, in a recent Court of Appeals case regard-
ing Google Street View, Google reportedly argued that, in light of 
satellite imaging technology, “[c]omplete privacy does not exist.”131  
Similarly, the CEO of Google rather famously quipped in response to 
privacy concerns, “If you have something you don’t want anyone to 
know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place.”132  These as-
sertions suggest that this lack of privacy holds true even when an in-
dividual has no opportunity to demonstrate a subjective expectation 
of privacy by opting out of Google Earth or retaining his or her pri-
vate information. 
Furthermore, even if an individual possessed a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, such a claim would likely fail the second prong of Katz 
as it is difficult to imagine society would be able to accept such an ex-
pectation as objectively reasonable in light of the broad use of this 
technology.  What is needed today is a reframing of the issue to re-
flect contemporary reality. 
 
130 See Updating our privacy policies and terms of service, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Jan. 24, 2012), 
available at http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/updating-our-privacy-policies-and-
terms.html, (describing the cross-sharing of individual information between different 
Google products). 
131 Defendant Google Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Dismiss 
Amended Complaint at 2, Boring v. Google Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 695 (W.D. Pa. 2009) 
(No. 08-cv-694) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. C (1977)); see al-
so Steven Musil, Google wins Street View privacy suit, CNET NEWS (Feb. 18, 2009), availa-
ble at news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10166532-93.html. 
132 Inside the Mind of Google (CNBC television broadcast Dec. 9, 2009), available at 
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=1409844721&play=1. 
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IV.  ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES OFFERED BY THE JUSTICES FALL SHORT 
IN ADDRESSING TODAY’S DECREASING EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
A.  Justice Harlan’s Balancing Test 
Justice Harlan’s balancing approach in White has significant draw-
backs in light of commercially-available surveillance.  When the sub-
jective expectation of privacy is lost, Justice Harlan would likely aban-
don the Katz two-prong test and address the issue by asking a 
different question:  whether it is desirable to allow law enforcement 
to utilize these publicly-available technologies.  As a threshold matter, 
this important value judgment is almost irrelevant because of the 
practical considerations.  Even if one were to decide that individuals 
should not be “saddled” with the ability of law enforcement to utilize 
said technologies, how would this be enforced?  It is hard to imagine 
a workable rule that forbids law enforcement from using Google 
Earth but allows others to do so.  While such a solution may be work-
able when addressing a more narrow technology such as wiretapping 
or GPS placement on vehicles, many other readily available technol-
ogies such as satellite imaging technology are different.  This tech-
nology is ubiquitous and available through the Internet to anyone 
free of charge.  Limiting it to non-law enforcement use would be arti-
ficial. 
More narrowly, the specific prongs of his proposed balancing test 
are also inadequate.  The first requires an assessment of the “nature 
of the practice.”  Given the ubiquitous nature of this technology, 
there is nothing out of the ordinary when the police use it.  Although 
highly intrusive, the nature of the government’s use of satellite imag-
ing technology is indistinguishable from private persons’ utilization 
of the free Internet program. 
The second prong of Justice Harlan’s balancing test would also 
fail.  It requires an examination of the extent of the impact of law en-
forcement’s use of technologies on society’s sense of security.  The 
extent of the impact of satellite imaging technology would be impos-
sible to measure when the complaint is itself that the technology is 
readily available to anyone at any time.  As such, law enforcement’s 
use of it is unlikely to more severely impact one’s sense of security 
than the technology itself. 
The third prong—the utility of the police action—also provides 
little assistance.  As with many forms of surveillance, the ability to ob-
serve the private property of an individual without alerting said indi-
vidual has great utility to the law enforcement.  Because the first two 
prongs are unworkable, they cannot be balanced against a prong that 
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will always be in favor of the government.  Therefore, Justice Harlan’s 
test fails to adequately respond to this twenty-first century problem. 
B.  Justice Blackmun’s Normative Inquiry 
Justice Blackmun’s normative approach in Smith may be a solution 
for the problem he envisioned:  a deterioration of privacy expecta-
tions caused by government “conditioning.”  However, when the expec-
tation is lost by all of society being conditioned by commercial entities, 
this normative inquiry solution seems unworkable.  By definition, if 
all of society has lost a subjective expectation of privacy, then a nor-
mative approach will be circular, as the normative expectation will 
likely duplicate the subjective.  This circularity is troubling when that 
societal choice “is ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-
recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms” from private commercial 
entities and social forces.  Furthermore, because many of these tech-
nologies offer no ability for an individual to demonstrate an expecta-
tion of privacy by opting out of this monitoring, a measurement of 
what the social norm is or should be is likely impossible. 
This normative approach is similar to Amsterdam’s proposed 
condemnation of an expectations analysis.133  Yet, both suffer the 
same fate because they fail to acknowledge the relevance of whether a 
suspect, claiming privacy in court, sought privacy initially.  While 
many have criticized the subjective prong of the Katz test, it serves a 
purpose.  There is a role for understanding whether the defendant 
thought his actions or items were private.134  If the Fourth Amend-
ment protects privacy rights, then the role of the judge is to deter-
mine if the government violated a defendant’s privacy rights.  Alt-
hough it is not determinative, a judge is guided in that decision by 
determining what the defendant actually considered private.  If he 
did not consider his actions or the searched location private, it is 
hard to imagine how his privacy was violated.135  Accordingly, the sub-
jective expectation, when given a meaningful opportunity to be 
 
133 See Amsterdam, supra note 37. 
134 Cf. Thomas K. Clancy, United States v. Jones:  Fourth Amendment Applicability in the 21st 
Century, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming Fall 2012) (arguing that to receive Fourth 
Amendment protection, one must take steps to exclude the government from accessing 
private areas, objects, and data), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2097811. 
135 See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 508–09 
(2007) (suggesting a blend of four models for Fourth Amendment protections, including 
the probabilistic model where “a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy when the 
odds are very high that others will not successfully pry into his affairs” and  “[a]s those 
odds drop, the individual’s expectation of privacy becomes less and less reasonable”). 
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demonstrated, can serve an important goal of enhancing privacy.  
Furthermore, a purely objective approach that “resist[s] captivation 
in any formula”136 is intellectually seductive, but in the realm of tech-
nology, impractical.  In contemporary society, digital divides based on 
income, age, and geography lead to different understandings of pri-
vacy when it intersects with technology.  Therefore, determining a 
normative understanding of privacy is impossible. 
C.  Justice Scalia’s Opinion in Kyllo 
Justice Scalia’s approach in Jones, which echoes his opinion in 
Kyllo,137 was strongly criticized as applying an eighteenth century solu-
tion to a twenty-first century problem.138  Prior to Kyllo, when faced 
with an issue involving enhanced technology being used by law en-
forcement, the Court almost always narrowed the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment.139  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Kyllo, 
found the police use of thermal imaging constituted a search.140  Con-
spicuously absent from the majority opinion was any endorsement of 
Katz.  Rather, Justice Scalia described the Katz opinion as “circular.”141  
Justice Scalia based his Kyllo analysis of new technology on two fac-
tors:  (1) whether the technology ascertained information from a 
constitutionally protected area that would normally require a physical 
intrusion, and (2) whether the technology was publicly available.  
“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any infor-
mation regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise 
have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally 
 
136 Amsterdam, supra note 37, at 385. 
137 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
138 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957–58 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Ironically, the 
Court has chosen to decide this case based on [eighteenth] century tort law.  By attaching 
a small GPS device to the underside of the vehicle that respondent drove, the law en-
forcement officers in this case engaged in conduct that might have provided grounds in 
1791 for a suit for trespass to chattels.  And for this reason, the Court concludes, the in-
stallation and use of the GPS device constituted a search.” (footnotes omitted)). 
139 Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding that the use of a pen register by a 
telephone company does not constitute a “search”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 
213–14 (1986) (holding that observation of a fenced-in backyard within curtilage of 
home from an airplane was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment); 
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1986) (holding that aerial map-
ping photography of an industrial complex by a government agent was not an unreason-
able search). 
140 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35 (holding that the use of a thermal imaging device from a public 
street to detect heat from within a private home constitutes a search). 
141 Id. at 34 (“The Katz test . . . has often been criticized as circular . . . .”). 
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protected area’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the 
technology in question is not in general public use.”142 
However, this approach suffers two fundamental flaws.  First, 
many modern threats to privacy do not involve physical trespass.  
Whether it is satellite imaging technology, triangulating cell phone 
signals,143 government-operated video cameras,144 or surveillance 
drones,145 the police today are able to intrude more and more deeply 
into individual’s lives with less actual physical encroachment. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the resurrection of the notion of a 
constitutionally protected area, such areas are difficult if not impossi-
ble to identify in today’s technology-driven world.  Although all 
would agree that the home is an area that its occupants consider 
highly private,146 technology allows searching of many more areas, 
from which a treasure trove of information can be obtained.  For ex-
ample, consider GPS surveillance, which 
generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public move-
ments that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, profes-
sional, religious, and sexual associations. . . . The Government can store 
such records and efficiently mine them for information years into the fu-
ture.  And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conven-
tional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it 
 
142 Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
143 Triangulation of cell phone signals “is the process of determining the coordinates of a 
point based on the known location of two other points.  If the direction (but not dis-
tance) from each known point to the unknown point can be determined, then a triangle 
can be drawn connecting all three points.”  In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Pro-
spective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 n.3 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).  “Knowledge of the locations of multiple towers receiving signals from a 
particular telephone at a given moment permits the determination, by simple mathemat-
ics, of the location of the telephone with a fair degree of precision” through triangula-
tion.  Id. at 451. 
144 See, e.g., Margaret Harding, Pittsburgh police laud Downtown surveillance cameras, TRIBLIVE 
NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://triblive.com/news/2753247-74/police-cameras-
surveillance-video-avenue-downtown-whetsell-camera-charged-detectives#axzz2A3B3I4Sb 
(describing a “network of private and public security cameras” used by the Pittsburgh po-
lice in the course of investigations); Karen Hopkins, Police Want to Quadruple Surveillance 
Cameras at Oceanfront, WVEC.COM (Oct. 16, 2012, 6:21 PM), http://www.wvec.com/my-
city/vabeach/Police-want-to-upgrade-expand-surveillance-cams-at-Oceanfront-
174387091.html (reporting on the Virginia Beach Police Department’s attempts to “in-
stall higher tech, digital cameras in trouble spots”). 
145 See generally, STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 83, at 8–9 (discussing the strong desire by law 
enforcement to employ drone aircrafts, and pressure on the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion to develop policies to allow such use); Brian Bennett, Police employ Predator drone spy 
planes on home front, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/de
c/10/nation/la-na-drone-arrest-20111211 (discussing the use of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection drones by local police). 
146 But see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985) (finding that a mobile home, even 
when used as a home, is a vehicle and therefore has a reduced expectation of privacy). 
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evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement prac-
tices . . . .147 
Similarly, satellite imaging technology observes curtilage, but the 
Court has previously held that as long as such images are taken from 
legal airspace with no interference in the possessory interest of the 
property, then no violation occurs.148 
Second, access to such technology is now readily available to the 
general public.  Satellite imaging technology is accessible through 
free programs such as Google Earth and available to anyone with an 
Internet connection.149  GPS devices are available for public purchase.  
So much of the technology utilized by law enforcement is indeed 
publicly available.  Thus, limiting its use on such a basis to civilians 
creates a legal fiction that attempts to cabin commonly used technol-
ogies as unavailable for government use, while considering the very 
same action unproblematic when done by a neighbor.150 
D.  Justice Scalia’s Opinion in Jones 
The majority opinion in Jones is also not responsive to these new 
technological realities.  An initial read of the opinion’s assertion that 
“the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, 
not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test,”151 may incor-
rectly lead one to conclude that Jones offers increased privacy protec-
tion.  Perhaps this is so, in the narrow context of GPS tracking.  As a 
practical matter, however, it adds no protection in the vast majority of 
surveillance techniques.  While the Court made passing reference to 
the government’s “attempt to find something or to obtain infor-
 
147 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955–56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted) (citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th. Cir. 
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)). 
148 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (noting that where one’s property is 
viewable from public airspace, no reasonable expectation to privacy exists); California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (“The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the 
police traveling in the public airways . . . to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is 
visible to the naked eye.”). 
149 273.1 million people in North America are reported as users of the Internet.  Internet Us-
age Statistics for the Americas, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.Internetworldstats.com/
stats2.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
150 See Alan Levin, Commercial Drones:  A Dogfight at the FAA, BUS. WK. (Feb. 9, 2012), 
www.businessweek.com/magazine/commercial-drones-a-dogfight-at-the-faa-
02092012.html (noting that Federal Aviation Administration rules permit the use of un-
manned drone aircraft by hobbyists, and that such drones will soon be “widely available 
for sale in the U.S.”). 
151 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (emphasis omitted). 
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mation,”152 the Court made clear that such activity becomes a search 
only when it is “conjoined” with a trespass.153  As mentioned, with sat-
ellite imaging technology, online data collection, and other technol-
ogies, there is no physical trespass, unlike GPS technology.  Thus, as 
Justices Alito and Sotomayor point out, the majority’s opinion in Jones 
does nothing to enhance privacy protections in general.154  However, 
none of the opinions adequately address the effect on the subjective 
expectation of privacy. 
E.  Justice Sotomayor’s Concerns 
Of the opinions articulated in Jones, Justice Sotomayor’s is the 
most aware of the implications of ubiquitous technology on society’s 
expectations.  She joined Justice Scalia’s majority opinion. However, 
she wrote separately, stating she joined the majority because she 
viewed Justice Alito’s approach as perhaps more privacy-limiting.  Not 
without reason, she then wrote separately, stating: 
Justice Alito’s approach, which discounts altogether the constitutional 
relevance of the Government’s physical intrusion on Jones’ Jeep, erodes 
that longstanding protection for privacy expectations inherent in items 
of property that people possess or control.  By contrast, the trespassory 
test applied in the majority’s opinion reflects an irreducible constitution-
al minimum:  When the Government physically invades personal proper-
ty to gather information, a search occurs.155 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence does, however, find common 
ground with some of Justice Alito’s approach.  She agrees with Justice 
Alito’s “incisive[]” observation that “the same technological advances 
that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will 
also affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy 
expectations.”156  Her main concern, however, is the government’s 
unrestrained ability to collect data.157  She recognizes that the Katz 
 
152 Id. at 951 n.5 (“Likewise with a search.  Trespass alone does not qualify, but there must be 
conjoined with that what was present here:  an attempt to find something or to obtain in-
formation.”). 
153 Id. 
154 See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning the validity of the Third Party Doc-
trine in today’s technology driven world, as “people reveal a great deal of information 
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks”); id. at 963 
(Alito, J., concurring) (commenting on devices that permit the monitoring of people’s 
movements, including closed circuit television, GPS services installed in vehicles and cell 
phones, and personal locator technology). 
155 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 955–56 (“In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of 
GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention.  GPS moni-
 
Nov. 2012] MISSED OPPORTUNITY 361 
 
approach may be “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal 
a great deal of information about themselves to third parties.”158  
More so than Justice Alito, she has a strong appreciation for the effect 
of this technology on perceptions of privacy.  She then somewhat 
narrowly characterizes this effect as implicating the individual’s rela-
tionship with his government. 
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and 
expressive freedoms.  And the Government’s unrestrained power to as-
semble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.  
The net result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at a relatively 
low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any 
person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to 
track—may “alter the relationship between citizen and government in a 
way that is inimical to democratic society.”159 
Justice Sotomayor is alone in discussing these deeper issues.  Her 
response is almost a hybrid of those offered by both Justice Harlan in 
White and Justice Blackmun in Smith.  She first seems to suggest that it 
is proper to consider societal norms.  She then suggests that it is im-
portant to follow Justice Harlan’s lead and examine the desirability of 
saddling society with such an intrusion by the police without a war-
rant.160  She next states she “would ask whether people reasonably ex-
pect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a 
manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at 
will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”161 
It is here that her solution falters.  In expanding her discussion to 
other technologies, she targets the Third Party Doctrine.162  In so do-
ing she characterizes the problem as a voluntary disclosure to a third 
party, as opposed to an involuntary gathering of data by business.  
She frames the digital reality of today as one in which information is 
 
toring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that re-
flects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual as-
sociations. . . . The Government can store such records and efficiently mine them for in-
formation years into the future.” (citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 
1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting))). 
158 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
159 Id. at 956 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(Flaum, J., concurring)). 
160 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (“I would also consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the 
Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable 
to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises 
of police power to and prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’” (quoting United 
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948))). 
161 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956. 
162 Id. at 957 (arguing that it should not invalidate Fourth Amendment privacy protections 
when information is “voluntarily disclosed” to third parties). 
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“voluntarily disclosed” by the public for a limited purpose and con-
cludes that such information should not be “disentitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection.”163  In doing so, she seems to join Justice 
Alito in framing the issue as a “‘tradeoff’ of privacy for conven-
ience.”164 
In the satellite imaging technology context, as well as with many 
other technologies, people do not themselves voluntarily disclose any 
such information to the public.  They never make the choice to par-
ticipate in such technology.  They never have the opportunity to 
make such a “tradeoff” of losing privacy in exchange for other social 
gains.  To the contrary, even their consent is never obtained.  In fact, 
at times, companies such as Google have actively circumvented the 
“third party cookie blocking” privacy feature of web browsers to ob-
tain information without users’ knowledge.165  Therefore, Justice So-
tomayor’s solution of abandoning the Third Party Doctrine offers on-
ly a partial accounting for this problem.  While it may address 
scenarios where the information is exchanged voluntarily, it does 
nothing when the information is obtained unbeknownst to the indi-
vidual. 
D.  Justice Alito’s Retention of a Compromised Katz 
Justice Alito asserts plainly that Katz avoids the problems of the 
Scalia approach.166  For the reasons previously discussed in Part I.B, 
this two-pronged approach is flawed in the context of some of these 
technologies.  Therefore, this assertion that a properly applied Katz 
analysis avoids problems is not without weakness.  Even Justice Alito is 
 
163 Id. 
164 Id. (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring)). 
165 Jonathan Mayer, SafariTrackers, WEB POLICY (Feb. 17, 2012), http://webpolicy.org/2012
/02/17/safari-trackers/ (analyzing the Internet browser Safari’s “cookie blocking” fea-
ture, and efforts by companies like Google and Vibrant to circumvent Internet browser 
privacy settings); see also Defendant Google Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its 
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 1, Boring v. Google, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 695 
(W.D. Pa. 2009) (defending Google’s practice of taking pictures of private homes for its 
Internet “Street View” feature); Google’s Circumvention of Browser Privacy Settings, EPIC, 
http://epic.org/privacy/google/tracking/googles_circumvention_of_brows.html (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2012) (reporting on Google’s efforts to circumvent Internet privacy safe-
guards in order to target advertising more specifically); Steven Musil, Google wins Street 
View Privacy Suit, CNET NEWS (Feb. 18, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-
10166532-93.html (reporting Google’s successful legal defense of its “Street View” process 
of taking pictures of private homes against a reasonable expectation of privacy chal-
lenge). 
166 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Katz expectation-of-privacy test avoids 
the problems and complications noted above . . . .”). 
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forced to acknowledge some weakness in the Katz approach.167  He 
recognizes that 
[T]he Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable 
person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations.  But 
technology can change those expectations.  Dramatic technological 
change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux 
and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.  
New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the 
expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.168 
Again, here Justice Alito assumes there is a “tradeoff.”  How that can 
be assumed is questionable in the context of satellite imaging tech-
nology or other data collection mechanisms that do not allow for user 
notice or consent.  In many instances, a tradeoff can be assumed if 
there is an opportunity to demonstrate an expectation of privacy and 
but the individual chooses not to take that opportunity.  For example, 
the decision to participate in social networking, even on a limited ba-
sis with a small network of contacts, brings with it some collection of 
data by companies such as Facebook.169  However, it may not bring 
with it an agreement to be tracked by third parties.  With the Library 
of Congress archiving all public tweets,170 the decision to engage in 
Twitter involves trading off some privacy.  But increasingly, individu-
als are having private data taken from them and assuming there is 
nothing they can do.  For these reasons, Justice Alito correctly de-
mands a legislative solution.171 
V.  NEW PROPOSAL:  OWNERSHIP OF DIGITAL FOOTPRINTS AND OPT-IN 
PROVISION TO SHARE SUCH DATA 
While these alternative approaches may be viable in certain cir-
cumstances, they are inadequate for this contemporary problem of a 
loss of a Katz subjective expectation of privacy due to commercial 
conditioning.  On one end of the spectrum of solutions is to do noth-
ing.  Justice Alito’s reluctant application of Katz would result in no 
 
167 Id. (acknowledging that the Katz test “is not without its own difficulties”). 
168 Id. 
169 See Juan Carlos Perez, Facebook Admits Ad Service Tracks Logged-Off Users, PCWORLD (Dec. 3, 
2007, 12:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/140225/article.html (reporting that 
Facebook admitted to allowing an ad service to track its users activities even while logged-
off from the site). 
170 News Releases:  Twitter Donates Entire Tweet Archive to Library of Congress, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.loc.gov/today/pr/2010/10-081.html (announc-
ing Twitter’s agreement to donate its digital archive of public tweets to the Library of 
Congress). 
171 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In circumstances involving dramatic 
technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”). 
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expectation of privacy, even in data exposed to the public without 
express consent of the individual.  In the satellite imaging context, 
this would mean the curtilage of the home.172  This rather draconian 
result provides clarity and may support an originalist view of the 
Amendment as protective of the interior of the home.  However, this 
severe limitation on Fourth Amendment protections, caused by 
commercial activity, fails to satisfy.  There is something fundamental 
about Brandeis’s “right to be left alone.”  That right is honored when 
society decides that an individual loses said right when he demon-
strates a willingness to sacrifice it.  Ruling that one loses this central 
right when a commercial entity takes it with impunity affronts this 
core value. 
The other extreme would be a new constitutional test for a gov-
ernment search.  Just as the technology of the telephone drove the 
opinion in Katz, so too could the technological development of satel-
lite imaging or other similar technologies drive a new approach.  
However, tying a new test for reasonableness to technological ad-
vances is always problematic, as the effectiveness of the new approach 
is likely outdated before the ink outlining said test is dry.  While this 
may have been more manageable in 1967, today’s technology is 
changing so rapidly that the ability of the law to respond with the 
needed alacrity is questionable.  Indeed, the Court noted as much in 
2010, cautioning that “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too 
fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology 
before its role in society has become clear.”173 
A.  Functionality 
The most viable and less extreme solution is a statutory one.  Jus-
tice Alito comes the closest to recognizing this as a required solution.  
He concedes that some privacy losses are not the product of value 
tradeoff, but rather of a situation in which “the public does not wel-
come the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, 
[though] they may eventually reconcile themselves to this develop-
ment as inevitable.”174  Justice Alito urges Congress to act, as it is “well 
situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, 
 
172 Although Justice Scalia obtained five votes for his approach in Jones, this arguably does 
not affect the proposed scenario by supplanting Justice Alito’s model.  As Justice Scalia 
concedes, with data intrusions there is often no physical trespass, so Katz would apply.  
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals 
without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”). 
173 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010). 
174 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
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and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”175  
Although such a statutory approach is plagued by the same problem 
as a new Fourth Amendment test—the rapid pace of changing tech-
nology—it should not target the technology.  Any such approach 
should be a functional one and not a technological one. 
Functionally, the actual problem is commercial conditioning.  It is 
here where the Court has failed to correctly identify the issue and 
thus the solution.  Justice Sotomayor describes an individual’s data 
that has been exposed to and assembled by the government as “vol-
untarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited pur-
pose . . . .”176  Justice Alito frames the issues as a “tradeoff” which also 
suggests a voluntary choice.177  However, in the satellite imaging tech-
nology model and others, the disclosure of information is not volun-
tary, as the individual has been afforded no opportunity to refuse.  
This is where Congress must focus. 
The problem is really who owns a person’s “digital dossier” or “dig-
ital identity.”  Professor Solove coined the term “digital dossier,” not-
ing that it includes information about individuals compiled by “com-
panies [they] have never established any contact with,” through 
which others “can glean information relating to [a person’s] financial 
transactions, debts, creditors, and checking accounts[,] . . . . race, in-
come, opinions, political beliefs, health, lifestyle, and purchasing 
habits[,] . . . . supermarket purchases, . . . . inventory of one’s grocer-
ies, over-the-counter medications, hygiene supplies, and contracep-
tive devices,” among other things.178  Palfrey and Glasser describe it as 
all the personally identifiable digital information associated with 
one’s name, and they further discuss one’s digital identity as a subset 
of information “composed of all those data elements that are dis-
closed online to third parties, whether it is by [one’s] choice or 
not.”179  Our current system of Fourth Amendment protection seems 
to accept that the “digital dossier” or “digital identity” of an individu-
al is considered abandoned when possessed by a third party.  Current 
law does not take into account how a third party collects that data or 
 
175 Id. at 964. 
176 Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
177 Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
178 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1083, 1092 (2002); see also id. at 1095 (describing digital dossiers as “digital biog-
raphies, a horde of aggregated bits of information combined to reveal a portrait of who 
we are based upon what we buy, the organizations we belong to, how we navigate the In-
ternet, and which shows and videos we watch”). 
179 JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL:  UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF 
DIGITAL NATIVES 40 (2008). 
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that often the individual had no meaningful opportunity to consent to 
either the initial collection of that data or the subsequent sharing of 
it.180  A legislative solution must focus on this problem. 
Such legislation should focus on commercial services that collect 
information from digital dossiers and expose it to the public or other 
third parties.  In the satellite imaging context, this would mean com-
panies that visually expose concealed private property.  In the search 
engine world it includes companies that record information about 
users and share it with advertisers.181  Such businesses should not be 
allowed to condition individuals that this information exposure will 
just happen, so any expectation of privacy is lost.  Rather, the law 
should require a meaningful “opt-in” provision prior to making the 
information publicly available.  Congress must enact legislation that 
precludes publication of private data, including images of private 
property, when the individual does not opt in to such disclosure. 
B.  Precedence 
While this may at first appear unprecedented, there is a rich histo-
ry of such a response.  Justice Alito most recently called for a legisla-
tive response to these inexpensive and intrusive technological abili-
ties.182 
Historic precedent supports this approach.  After Smith, Congress 
enacted laws that effectively required procedural review prior to mon-
 
180 For example, Austrian law student Max Schrems has spearheaded a movement to disclose 
the amount of information Facebook collects from its users.  See Kashmir Hill, Max 
Schrems:  The Austrian Thorn in Facebook’s Side, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2012, 10:03 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/07/the-austrian-thorn-in-facebooks-
side/.  Using a provision in European privacy law referred to as the “right to access,” 
Schrems requested that Facebook disclose the dossier collected on him.  Id.  He received 
over 1200 pages of information that he was unaware Facebook had been collecting, in-
cuding:  e-mail addresses he never provided, deleted messages, records of who else signed 
on to Facebook from his computer, etc.  Id. 
181 Cecilia Kang, Google announces privacy changes across products; users can’t opt out, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/google-tracks-
consumers-across-products-users-cant-opt-out/2012/01/24/gIQArgJHOQ_story.html 
(describing Google’s plan to integrate data collected across its sites, including its search 
engine, YouTube, and Gmail, ostensibly to allow Google to “better tailor its ads to peo-
ple’s tastes”); Hiawatha Bray, Google policy brings privacy worry, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 
24, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2012/02/24/critics-google-changes-
threaten-privacy/xIpso7CMd143KjvlC7FyqN/story.html?camp=pm (reporting on the 
changes to Google’s privacy policies that will allow information gathered about users of 
any one of its products, including its Android operating system on smartphones, to be 
shared across other Google platforms in order to “deliver more accurate search results 
and advertising that is more relevant to individual customers”). 
182 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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itoring dialed phone numbers.183  Congress, through Title III of the 
Electronic Communication Privacy Act, drafted provisions governing 
the use of pen registers, including imposition of a requirement that 
government officials first certify before an authorized magistrate that 
“the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing crim-
inal investigation.”184  The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(“COPPA”) forbids the collection of personal information from a 
child by website operators unless they obtain verifiable parental con-
sent.185  In other words, parents must opt in to that disclosure.  More 
recently, the federal implementation of a “Do Not Call List” provides 
firmer ground for such a solution.186  Such legislation and rules forbid 
direct automatic dialing systems contacting any cellular phone or 
phone that would be charged.187  Similarly it forbids telemarketing 
phone calls without prior consent of party.188  Such legislation and 
regulations balance consumer protection with commercial interests.  
Although an opt-out approach, this legislation supplies precedence 
for the proposed governmental regulation. 
There is compelling support, not just historical precedent, for 
such an approach both abroad and more recently domestically.  The 
strongest support for this legislative solution comes from overseas.  
While here in the United States, the Court has seemingly thrown up 
its hands at the reality of the collection of personal data and its impli-
cations for privacy, Europeans have taken a different position.189  Eu-
 
183 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2006) (describing 
procedures for applications to the courts by government lawyers for the installation and 
use of pen registers or trap and trace devices). 
184 18 U.S.C. §§ 3122(a)(2), 3122(b)(2) (2006). 
185 15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2006). 
186 15 U.S.C. § 6151 (2006). 
187 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(iii) (2011). 
188 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) (2011). 
189 An example of European resistance to privacy intrusion is reflected in its response to 
Google Street View technology.  Some European countries disallowed the collection of 
data pending an investigation; in other nations, the individuals physically blocked roads 
to keep the vehicles from gathering information.  See Geissler, supra note 115, at 899.  Still 
others fined Google.  Id. at 917.  Google has been fined by the FCC, sanctioned in France 
and Switzerland, banned from collecting images in Greece, and suspended in Austria and 
the Czech Republic.  Court rules in favour of Google Street View, SWISSINFO.CH (June 8, 2012, 
1:41 PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss_news/Court_rules_in_favour_of_Google_S
treet_View.html?cid=32861794 (reporting on the ruling of a Swiss Federal Court requir-
ing Google to implement blurring of faces and car license plates with an accessible pro-
cess for requests to be filed without red tape, and commenting that in Austria and the 
Czech Republic, Google Maps Street View has been suspended since 2010); Geissler, su-
pra note 115, at 899, 917 (noting that Greece and the Czech Republic forbade Google 
from taking additional images while those countries investigated possible privacy viola-
tions, and that France fined Google 100,000 euros for improperly collecting personal da-
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ropeans have combated the invasion of privacy not by precluding its 
disclosure, but by increasing individual control over the data.190 
The Charter for Fundamental Rights of the European Union af-
fords privacy protection a hallowed place, fundamental to the free-
doms inherent in being human.  Article Eight provides that 
“[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data concern-
ing him or her.”191  This includes the right to have the data processed 
“fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the 
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.”192  
It further includes the right of access to any data collected.193  Since 
1995, the main European Union legislation in this area has been the 
Data Protection Directive, Directive 95/46/EC, which regulates the 
processing of personal data.194  Personal data includes “any infor-
mation relating to an individual, whether it relates to his or her pri-
vate, professional or public life.”195  However, the European Commis-
sion recognized the limits of this directive due to the reality that 
“[t]echnological progress and globalisation have profoundly changed 
the way our data is collected” as well as that each European Union 
member state implemented it with different rules and regulations.196 
 
ta); Hayley Tsukayama, Google fined by FCC for impeding Street View probe, WASH. POST (Apr. 
16, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/google-fined-by-fcc-for-
impeding-street-view-probe/2012/04/16/gIQAePySLT_story.html (describing the FCC’s 
decision to fine Google $25,000 for obstructing the Commission’s investigation by not re-
sponding to requests for material information or provide certifications or verifircations of 
its responses).  Most of the forty countries in which the application is available have ex-
pressed concern over Street View.  Court rules in favour of Google Street View, supra. 
190 Court rules in favour of Google Street View, supra note 189 (explaining recent decision by 
Swiss Federal Administrative Court requiring Google Street View to attend to all requests 
by individuals to have their images blurred and anonymity protected). 
191 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8(1), 2000 O.J. (C 364) 10.  
This concept of digital protection has been said to be linked to privacy as a “personality 
right, . . . predicated on dignity.”  Karen Eltis, Breaking Through the “Tower of Babel”:  A 
“Right to be Forgotten” and How Trans-Systemic Thinking Can Help Re-Conceptualize Privacy 
Harm in the Age of Analytics, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 69, 93 (2011).  
Such an idea also harkens back to Brandeis and Warren’s description of privacy as a prin-
ciple of “inviolate personality.”  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 211. 
192 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 191, at art. 8(2). 
193 Id. 
194 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf. 
195 Press Release, European Commission, Data Protection Reform:  Frequently asked ques-
tions at 1 (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?ref
erence=MEMO/12/41&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
196 Press Release, European Comission, Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of 
data protection rules to increase users’ control of their data and to cut costs for business-
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Consequently, on January 25, 2012 the European Commission in-
troduced several proposed reforms to its 1995 Data Protection Di-
rective.197  The reforms relevant to this Article focus not on govern-
ment use of data, but further upstream on both data collection and 
the use of data once collected.  The touchstone for this approach is 
not a nebulous concept of privacy; rather, its framework is more akin 
to assessing the right of the individual to own his own data, and the 
corresponding lack of a right of commercial entities to take data 
without consequences.  It is an extension of the “right of personali-
ty.”198 
The proposal is part of a three-fold regime.  The first allows a min-
imum amount of data to be collected.199  The second demands that 
privacy-enhancing default settings be the norm.200  This is known as 
“privacy by default.”201  The third involves a concept of “data protec-
tion by design.” 202  A hallmark of this is the concept of the individu-
al’s apparent right to continuous control over one’s own information.  
For example, this includes the requirement of a data subject’s con-
sent to processing of information.203  Notably, this consent necessarily 
would seem to be more than an agreement to a “terms of use” docu-
 
es (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference
=IP/12/46&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
197 See id. 
198 Rolf H. Weber, The Right to Be Forgotten:  More than a Pandora’s Box?, 2 JIPITEC 120, 121 
(2011), available at http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-2-2-2011/3084/jipitec%202%20-
%20a%20-%20weber.pdf (explaining that the European concept of “the right to be for-
gotten can be considered as contained in the right of the personality [sic], encompassing 
several elements such as dignity, honor, and the right to private life”). 
199 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, at 43–44, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (Articles 5 and 6). 
200 European Commission, How does the data protection reform strengthen citizens’ rights?, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/
factsheets/2_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (explaining “privacy by design” and “pri-
vacy by default” as principles that require that “data protection safeguards should be built 
into products and services from the earliest stage of development, and that privacy-
friendly default settings should be the norm”). 
201 Press Release, European Commission, Security industry:  Commission proposes Action 
Plan to enable growth—further details (July 30, 2012), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/605&format=PD
F&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, supra note 199, at 56 (Article 23). 
202 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parilament and of the Council on the protec-
tion of Individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, supra note 199, at 56 (Article 23). 
203 Id. at 43–44 (Articles 5 and 6). 
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ment.  Such “terms of use” agreements do little to effectively inform 
the consumer of her rights due to their length and complicated lan-
guage.  Additionally, they also hold the individual hostage by preclud-
ing the use of the service if he does not agree to the privacy in-
fringements.  The reforms address this by stating that “[c]onsent shall 
not provide a legal basis for the processing, where there is a signifi-
cant imbalance between the position of the data subject and the con-
troller.”204  Further, the individual does not lose his rights to his in-
formation once consent is given.  Rather, he has the right to withdraw 
consent at any time.205  Even after made public, the individual retains 
a “right to be forgotten and to erasure.”206  This allows individuals the 
right to request their data be deleted and compels the Internet ser-
vice provider to completely delete all personal data belonging to an 
individual and communicate that request to third parties.207  The 
rights of individuals include rights to transparent information, to in-
formation about and access to data collected, as well as rectification, 
and erasure.208 
More recently, the federal government has also moved closer to 
conceptualizing the need for more individual control over one’s per-
sonal data.  In February 2012, the White House announced the 
Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation In the Global 
Digital Economy.209  Here, the White House recognized that “additional 
[privacy] protections are necessary.”210  This framework contains a 
“Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights” that states:  “Consumers have a 
right to exercise control over what personal data companies collect 
from them and how they use it.”211  Additionally, the Bill of Rights in-
cludes the “right to expect that companies will collect, use, and dis-
 
204 Id. at 45 (Article 7). 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 51 (Article 17). 
207 Id.; European Commission, supra note 200. 
208 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes 
of prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, and the free movement of such data at 8, COM (2012) 10 final (Jan. 25, 2012), avail-
able at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0010:FIN
:EN:PDF (stating the rights of the data subject). 
209 Press Release, The White House, We Can’t Wait:  Obama Administration Unveils Blue-
print for a “Privacy Bill of Rights” to Protect Consumers Online (Feb. 23, 2012), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obama-
administration-unveils-blueprint-privacy-bill-rights. 
210 THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD:  A FRAMEWORK 
FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 
1 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf. 
211 Id. at 47 (delineating the “Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights”). 
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close personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in 
which consumers provide the data.”212 
This proposal is a move in the right direction; however, it falls 
short.  For example, the White House proposal directs the Commerce 
Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Ad-
ministration (“NTIA”) to develop the implementation of these rights.  
Unlike the European approach, the White House approach appears 
to intend a voluntary system for those affected companies.  In its re-
quest for comment, the NTIA discussed “encouraging” companies to 
develop voluntary codes of conduct that would only be legally en-
forced if participants commit to them and then fail to comply.213  
However, voluntary regimes have not been successful.214  For example, 
Google and other such companies change privacy policies with im-
punity to decrease the amount of protection provided by privacy 
terms from what it was when customers first signed on with the com-
pany.215  Recently, the Europeans also warned Google that the new 
 
212 Id. 
213 Multistakeholder Process to Develop Consumer Data Privacy Codes of Conduct, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 43, 13098 (Mar. 5, 2012). 
214 For example, Google had voluntarily agreed to a consent order in October 2011, follow-
ing an FTC investigation.  Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. F.T.C., 844 F. Supp. 2d 98, 100 
(D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 2012 WL 1155661 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2012).  Three months later, 
Google announced that it would change its privacy policy to allow much increased track-
ing of information, leading to the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) filing a 
lawsuit that such action is in a violation of an October 2011 consent order in a previous 
lawsuit.  Id.  (“Google announced in January 2012 that it would implement changes to its 
user privacy policies for all of its services.  EPIC contends that this intended policy 
change, which is scheduled to take effect on March 1, 2012, will violate the Consent Or-
der.  Although EPIC is not a party to the Consent Order, it filed a motion for temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction on the grounds that the FTC has a ‘manda-
tory, nondiscretionary duty’ to enforce it.”); see also EPIC v. FTC (Enforcement of the Google 
Consent Order), EPIC, http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/consent-order.html (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2012) (summarizing the background and news surrounding EPIC’s lawsuit to en-
force the Google consent order, as well as giving an overview of the legal proceedings); 
Somini Sengupta, Consumer Rights Groups Says Google Broke Its Promise, N.Y. TIMES BITS 
BLOG (Feb. 8, 2012, 8:45 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/consumer-
rights-group-says-google-broke-its-promise/ (reporting on the respective positions of 
EPIC and Google on the litigation surrounding the potential violation of Google’s con-
sent order with the FTC by Google’s announced data collection changes). 
215 See John P. Mello Jr., Facebook Changes Privacy Policy Again, PC WORLD (Mar. 21, 2012, 
11:17 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/252289/facebook_changes_privacy_policy_
again.html (reporting on Facebook’s decision to eliminate its “privacy policy” in favor of a 
“data-use policy” that allows more extensive collection and use of data by the company, 
and going on to note that users agree to the statement “simply by using Facebook” (quot-
ing Sarah A. Downey, a Boston-area online privacy attorney)); Kang, supra note 181 (de-
scribing the plight of a Gmail user who “might never have imagined that the content of 
his or her [e-mail] messages could affect the experience on seemingly unrelated Web 
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policy “does not meet the requirements of the European Directive on 
Data Protection,”216 but to no avail. 
Additionally, the White House proposal is lacking specifics.  As a 
technical matter, commercial entities could claim that today’s users 
are given a choice not to be tracked that is arguably consistent with 
these vague White House concepts.  But the choice is false.  Consent 
must be meaningful for it to be a legitimate protection of privacy.  It 
currently is not meaningful.  Consent is not voluntary if obtained 
through a coercive or imbalanced terms of service agreement.  By 
placing the consent provisions in such an agreement, use of the ser-
vice is conditional on the “consent.”  That is hardly a voluntary con-
sent; it seems more akin to coercion.  Embedding consent in the 
terms of service is simply not a viable option for privacy protection if 
individuals cannot avail themselves of the service if they do not con-
sent to the terms.  While that may be appropriate for optional prefer-
ences, such as consenting to Internet service providers disclosing in-
formation when lawfully subpoenaed, it is not reasonable to demand 
consent to sell personal information to unknown third parties for 
profit in exchange for a needed service.  For consent to be legitimate, 
it must be a result of an opt-in structure. 
The concept of an opt-in provision has some support in the Unit-
ed States Congress.  “Do Not Track” bills have been proposed in both 
the House and Senate.217  The Do Not Track Me Online Act proposed 
to have the Federal Trade Commission promulgate rules for an 
“online opt-out mechanism” to allow consumers to effectively and 
easily prohibit the collection or use of “covered information.”218  
However, it applied to limited entities whose primary business is col-
lecting such information, covered only limited information, and car-
ried an insignificant penalty.219  Such a narrow focus does nothing to 
prevent the dissemination of one’s image or images of items or prop-
 
sites such as YouTube” as an illustrative example of the potential privacy consequences of 
Google’s decision to integrate data collected across its different services). 
216 Letter from Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, President, Commission Nationale de 
l’Informatique et des Libertés, to Larry Page, CEO, Google Inc. (Feb. 27, 2012), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2012/20120227_letter_cnil_google_privacy_policy_en.pdf. 
217 For the House of Representatives bill, see Do Not Track Me Online Act, H.R. 654, 112th 
Cong. (2011).  A similar bill was also introduced in the Senate.  Do-Not-Track Online Act 
of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. (2011).  A narrower third bill targeting the prevention of 
tracking of information regarding minor children was also proposed.  See Do Not Track 
Kids Act of 2011, H.R. 1895, 112th Cong. (2011). 
218 Do Not Track Me Online Act, H.R. 654, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011). 
219 Id. at §§ 2(2), 2(3), 5(b). 
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erty that one has attempted to keep private.220  The Senate version, 
the Do Not Track Online Act of 2011, is perhaps even weaker.  It au-
thorizes the Federal Trade Commission to promote regulations that 
allow individuals to indicate “whether [they] prefer to have personal 
information collected . . . .”221  Even current coercive terms of service 
agreements would seem to comply with this vague proposal.  Moreo-
ver, it seems to cover only the initial collection of information, and 
not subsequent use. 
An opt-in system also appears to be technically possible.  For ex-
ample, in the context of satellite imaging, Google has the capability 
of obscuring images.222  Google Earth and Google Street View have 
voluntarily complied with requests from governments to blur images 
for security reasons.  These include blurring the entire city of North 
Oaks, Minnesota, whose roads are private, as well as locations such as 
governmental residences, military locations, research facilities, and 
energy sources which could be the target of a terrorist attack.223  In 
Germany, Google will blur a resident’s building at his request and 
over 244,000 Germans have requested such.224  The Swiss Federal Su-
preme Court, in reversing an order requiring automatic removal of 
all Google Street View images, did require that 99% percent of the 
images be anonymized and that Google anonymize the remaining 
images upon request in an “efficient and unbureaucratic manner.”225  
The court did require complete blurring of images of persons and 
 
220 See Geissler, supra note 115, at 915. 
221 Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2011). 
222 See, e.g., Kelly Hearn, Terrorist Use of Google Earth Raises Security Fears, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
(Mar. 12, 2007), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/03/070312-google-
censor.html (reporting that Google replaced detailed images of British military bases with 
pre-Iraq war data). 
223 Lora Pabst, North Oaks tells Google Maps:  Keep Out—we mean it, STARTRIBUNE (May 31, 
2008) www.startribune.com/lifestyle/19416279.html (reporting on Google’s compliance 
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owned by residents, to be removed from Google Maps); see also IT Security Editors, 
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224 Kevin J. O’Brien, 244,000 Germans Opt Out of Google Mapping Service, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/technology/21google.html.  This would 
include allowing people to opt out of photo archives. 
225 Press Release, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Data protection matters in the context of 
Google Street View:  Federal Supreme Court partially upholds Google’s appeal (June 8, 
2012), available at http://www.bger.ch/mm_1c_230_2011_d.pdf; see also Marta Falconi, 
Swiss Court Hands Win to Google, WALL ST. J., June 9–10, 2012, at B4 (reporting on the Swiss 
court’s decision to uphold the privacy ruling requiring Google to manually blur out the 
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vehicle number plates prior to publication.226 This ruling will require 
Google to lower its cameras to prevent viewing over walls and hedges 
because the ruling forbids publication of images not visible by pass-
ersby.227  After public outcry, Google Maps Street View agreed to blur 
depictions of people and license plates in its images.228  Furthermore, 
several Internet companies have expressed support for weak regula-
tions and have not raised technical objections,229 thus implying the 
regulations are technically possible. 
The debate within the industry has focused not on infeasibility, 
but on definitions.  In 2012, the World Wide Web Consortium, an in-
ternational organization dedicated to the long-term growth of the 
web, convened a Working Group on Tracking Protection.230  The 
purpose of their group was to develop standards for a “Do Not Track” 
policy to protect personal privacy, which allows one to use a one-click 
browser setting to set up an HTTP header that will tell websites one 
does not want to be tracked.231  This discussion focused on definitions 
and challenges, and distinguished itself from industry-only efforts.232  
Interestingly, according to the privacy organization Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation, the objection to this “Do Not Track” policy comes 
from online advertising organizations, who claim it will destroy their 
profits.233  In contrast, Microsoft has announced its next version of In-
 
226 Press Release, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Data protection matters in the context of 
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ternet Explorer, IE10, will have “do not track” as its default browser 
setting, requiring users to affirmatively opt-in to tracking.234  This 
seems to fly in the face of the Association of National Advertisers ar-
gument that such a move will destroy businesses.235 
C.  Future 
These initiatives, both domestic and international, provide sup-
port for legislation requiring an “opt-in” to information sharing 
based on a conceptualization of ownership of digital information.  
Such legislation must have certain characteristics.  It must address 
functionality, not technology.  Here the functionality is commercial 
grooming to eradicate the reasonable expectation of privacy by ob-
taining information and displaying it.  It must have a meaningful opt-
in provision that is not tied to the terms of service.  Finally, it must in-
corporate concepts of data ownership by the individual. 
In the satellite imaging technology scenario, this could similarly 
be accomplished.  The individual would by default be assumed not to 
disclose property to the entities that image and publish it.  The au-
tomatic setting is to minimum disclosure.  If this information is col-
lected, the individual owns the image of his private property and has 
the right to preclude its publication. 
This legislation, combined with current Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence, would restore the necessary privacy protections.  It would 
not only protect privacy, but it would do so by providing the mecha-
nism by which one can demonstrate one’s expectation of privacy.  
Thus, application of the Katz test would be appropriate because a 
court would have some way of determining if a person demonstrated 
his expectation by selecting not to opt in to disclosure. 
Interestingly, Justice Scalia’s trespass-based solution may then 
prove viable, if combined with the concept of ownership of data.  If the 
law were to recognize that individuals own their digital footprints, 
then when the government obtains this data in collecting infor-
mation, it has “engag[ed] in physical intrusion of a constitutionally 
 
(stating that advertising industry representatives insist that they be allowed to continue 
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2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/01/technology/Internet-explorer-do-not-
track/index.htm (reporting on Microsoft’s decision to implement “Do Not Track” as a 
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protected area in order to obtain information . . . .”236  As such, a 
search has occurred under Jones.  Such a marrying of concepts—
ownership of digital information and a trespass-based analysis—may 
then provide additional protection.  The landscape would be as fol-
lows:  an individual owns her digital footprint when it is information 
about herself or about papers, houses, or effects which she has 
demonstrated a desire to keep private by not actively disclosing that 
information.  A company may not condition her expectation of priva-
cy.  Rather, information will be private if she has not opted for its dis-
closure.  Should the government use technology to gain that infor-
mation, it has conducted a search. 
CONCLUSION 
The contemporary problem is that individuals no longer possess 
true subjective expectations of privacy due to an awareness of the 
possibility that information about them will be gathered through 
publicly available technologies.  The consequences of this must be al-
tered.  Under today’s regime, the consequences include a lack of 
Fourth Amendment protection.  Such should not be the case, partic-
ularly when that lack of expectation is due to commercial condition-
ing.  Instead, our legislative response should adopt a data ownership 
model for data exposed either through no action of the individual or 
collaterally to a transaction.  This model should require an opt-in ap-
proach for information sharing and an ability to retrieve published 
information when desired.  This ownership model works with our 
fundamental Fourth Amendment understandings.  Thus, the indi-
vidual has an option to demonstrate her privacy expectations and 
trigger Fourth Amendment protection. 
 
236 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 
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